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Abstract
The evolutionary advantage of humans is in our unique ability to process stories – we have highly evolved
‘narrative organs.’ Through storytelling, vicarious knowledge, even guarded knowledge, is used to help our species
survive. We learn, regardless of whether the story being told is ‘truth’ or ‘fiction.’ Humans place themselves in
stories, as both observer and participant, to create a ‘neural balance’ or sweet spot that allows them to be immersed
in a story without being entirely threatened by it – and this involvement in story leads to the formation of empathy –
an empathy that is integral to forging a future humanity. It is through empathy, we argue, that stories have the power
to save us.
The hippocampi process narrative details. Situated alongside are the amygdalae – organs that place the reader in
the story. The temporal lobes store ‘story nuggets.’ Finally there’s the frontal cortex to inhibit full participation in
narrative, so that the story can be experienced vicariously.
Keywords: Storytelling; Empathy; Ipseity; Evolution; Narrative; 
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Introduction
When an invented character, fabricated by a writer of fiction,
reveals a ‘truth,’ sometimes that truth can beg for greater scrutiny. The
doctor who narrates the novel, There Where the Pepper Grows [1],
Benjamin Rahabi, tells the story of his escape from Nazi occupied
Poland to the welcoming embrace of Calcutta, on the premise that
stories have the power to save us. He does so with the authority of a
physician who has explored the dark edges of human storylines and
the impact they have on the body. The claim that stories have the
power to save us is audacious, yet it is one that can be validated by
neuroscience. This article demonstrates that the brain is hard-wired to
process stories in a most fundamental way, indicating the evolutionary
priority that storytelling has had in human development, and the
importance it has in forging a future humanity.
This article considers how human organs are devoted to narrative
function. More specifically, it looks at the validity of fictional truth –
the way the human brain uses ‘fictional worlds’ to expand
understanding about the ‘real world’ or phenomenal reality. It gives a
neurological foundation to Kenneth Burke’s notion that literature
provides us with ‘equipment for living.’ That stories work as ‘proverbs
writ large’ – helping us to understand the fundamentals of survival –
the workings of cooperation and conflict [2].
Supposing we were to treat the words of the above fictional
character, Benjamin Rahabi, as a hypothesis. Is there any way to
explore whether stories have the power to save us or not? Early
thinkers like Charles Darwin and Herbert Spencer wrote that the lack
of ability to adapt to events puts a species at an evolutionary
disadvantage [3,4]. More recent research into the nature of the human
brain pleads an evolutionary advantage to our capacity for narrative.
Central to our evolution has been the development of ‘narrative
organs,’ which we will discuss below.
The human brain, above all others, has the most developed ability
to extrapolate meaning and implications from stories. Moreover, one
of the great evolutionary advantages of being human is that we don’t
need to actually live through an event to gain the perspective of
someone else’s experience. We can identify a potentially disastrous or
beneficial event because we can recognise these through story,
mythology, recount and other narrative structures describing
comparable situations. Moreover, dangers and opportunities don’t
have to be identical, as they would have to be for a dog or monkey
(dogs salivate only to the sound of a bell – not the sound of a gong).
Unlike animals, we can infer meaning from metaphors. We can
translate scenarios into our own lives. We can imagine ourselves out of
our familiar comfort zones into a situation where we are genuinely
feeling threatened, even in a cozy bed with a novel in hand and a
partner snoring nearby. These are the functions of a storytelling brain,
which have developed over time, as an evolutionary imperative.
Not only does the human brain have this capacity, but it has some
well-developed neurological mechanisms that have evolved to help us
to store, recall and interpret situations and stories. These are located in
two parallel sets of organs – the two hippocampi (on the left and right
sides of the brain), which provide the capacity to store and recall
episodic memory, better known to fiction writers as narrative. They do
this by recording and recalling schemata or story nuggets, which are
largely stored in the nearby temporal lobes [5].
Before we speculate on the narrative function of the left and right
hippocampi, we should do so within the context of scholarship on the
differences between the two. McGilchrist argues that the left side of the
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brain is used for processing focused intention [6]. He describes a bird
using its left brain to look for seed [7]. The left hippocampus stores
and recalls smaller, less abstract narrative nuggets. It’s the narrative
that’s concerned with the functional and physical plane rather than the
metaphysical plane. In other words, the left hippocampus is more
tightly focused on what is going on right now – the so-called realities
of a situation – the narrow context of the story. How is that bird going
to get the seed? How is a character going to find her long lost brother
who was given up years ago for adoption? Which physical location
would characters go to if they were seeking spiritual enlightenment?
[8].
In contrast, McGilchrist [7] asserts that the right side of the brain
is used for processing global attention. The bird uses the right brain to
look out for broader context and circumstances, such as danger. The
right hippocampus stores and processes the meta-narrative in which
every story has to take place. In other words, what this story means on
a grander scale. The right hippocampus stores and recalls the notions
of time, place and setting – the context of the story rather than
narrative particulars – as well as the grand themes [9]. At the same
time, it allows the reader to ponder over the bigger issues – the themes
of the novel – and locate themselves in those themes. For example, if
someone is reading Animal Farm [10], they will understand the
analogy between the governance of the animal farm and the
corruption of real life political elites. The ability to contextualise and
step outside an immediate narrative, into an allegorical theme or
metanarrative, gives the reader a sense of perspective – even distance –
on story.
In terms of narrative, one story is nested in another and both
aspects of the brain contribute to a single picture. Similarly, in fiction,
these two aspects of story are fully integrated in a seamless fashion
within a single narrative structure. The reader absorbs a grand theme
(right brain), whilst observing the purely functional movements of
characters in a fictional setting (left brain).
Intersecting with the hippocampi are the amygdalae, a paired set
of organs that sit directly against the hippocampi. These moderate the
sense of ipseity – the location of the ‘I’ or ‘me’ in any particular story.
The amygdalae are instrumental in creating a sense of whether or not
we are involved in the story. As such, they are key processors of
emotion [11].
Once again, the right and left amygdalae correspond with the global
picture of the right brain and the specificity of the left brain. On a
grand scale, and the grand scale is what is moderated by the right
hemisphere, the right amygdala gives the reader contextual awareness
– if they are reading a thriller, it allows them to think, “I am not at risk.
I am reading a novel.”
The left amygdala, simultaneously, tells us whether the story has
any direct effect on us as individuals, right now – the prosaic reality.
It’s the organ that exerts the power of immediacy and imminence. The
ipseity – or sense that this concerns ‘me’ (the vicarious experience) –
locates the audience in the anguish of the present circumstances (albeit
via the experiences of the protagonist). In literary terms, it allows us to
plant a personal perspective into the story as if it were our story. This
type of ipseity allows us to watch the drama unfold while sitting on the
shoulder of the protagonist. Directors like Spielberg actually film from
the shoulder of the protagonist to get this sense of identification – the
left amygdala telling the audience “this directly concerns me.”
In a page-turner such as the Da Vinci Code [12], the reader is
required to surrender the left amygdala to directly experience the trials
of the protagonist, as if they were their own – as if they themselves
were being chased around Paris by an albino Corpus Dei monk! All
the time, the contextual ipseity that resides in the right amygdala
would remind the reader that they are sitting in the comfort and
security of their own home.
The contrast of what we would describe as dual ipseity (I’m in the
action, yet observing it) has been recognised by many thinkers.
Scholars as early as Aristotle, writing about catharsis, explained how
tragedy served to purge the audience of similar emotions [13]. Kant
observed how the overwhelming experience of awe is moderated by
the knowledge that we are actually safe [14].
The ability to locate oneself in a narrative is an essential element
of empathy. If one cannot feel the heartbeat of the protagonist as one’s
own, then either the author is implicated (for distancing the reader –
perhaps through experimental or meta-fictive devices, such as those
used by Bertolt Brecht [15]) or the reader may be defined as someone
who has lower capacity for empathy.
Neurological studies on empathy typically focus on the Theory of
Mind (TOM), which outlines the capacity of one individual to
comprehend and relate to another person’s emotional state [11]. In the
terms that we’re discussing here, the Theory of Mind can only be
constructed if there is sufficient dual ipseity to have a sense of ‘I’ (right
brain) as well as a sense of ‘I am transferred into the experience of
another’ (left brain). This ability to understand another person’s ‘I-
ness’ is interesting. We can’t say whether this comes from fiction or
from socialisation, but either way it is this mechanism that allows us to
empathise with each other, as well as with fictional protagonists. The
very fact that Theory of Mind can be applied to real people as well as
fictional people means that on a profound level, fiction provides an
equally ‘real’ milieu for the human brain to develop emotionally and
express its full humanity.
If the healthy mind organises narrative around a sense of ‘I-ness’
or ipseity, then a mind that doesn’t is declaratively unhealthy.
Neuroscientists Louis Sass and Josef Parnass propose that this loss of
self is a neglected, but fundamental feature of schizophrenia [16].
Certainly, the loss of ipseity is characterised by the most extreme and
troublesome cases of schizophrenia. The grueling first person account
of schizophrenia by Clara Kean, recounts a time of complete loss of
‘global’ self. Even though the ipseity of mundane awareness remained,
her sense of self was completely lost. “The real ‘me’ is not here any
more. I am disconnected, disintegrated, diminished. Everything I
experience is through a dense fog… It was not even my own distress—
I was totally separated from myself, not knowing what action I was
taking” [17]. Schizophrenia appears to cause underactive amygdalae –
on both sides of the brain, but particularly on the right – perhaps
explaining why those suffering are unable to locate themselves in their
‘story’ [18].
In contrast, in disorders that feature overactive amygdalae, such
as in affective paranoia, patients find it hard to relate to others,
primarily because they are manically fixated on their own personal
‘story’ and they transfer their ‘character’ into every conceivable
scenario. Patients often find it very hard not to believe that every story
concerns them, as a central protagonist. A classic example is the story
of Chadwick, a schizoaffective patient who perceived radio and
television commentators speaking to him personally, as if they were
part of his internal narrative. “I listened to the radio ‘for messages’ a
great deal in the summer of 1979” [19]. Balanced amygdalae are
essential for understanding others, as demonstrated in many Theory of
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Mind studies. In this context, Chadwick says, “I had very little capacity
to integrate thought and feeling,” and that, “my gist and context
processing were poor…I would often be accused of being tactless,
cheeky, offbeat, saying inappropriate things [20].”
In cases of both affective and non-affective psychoses, there is
ample evidence to suggest that the coupling of the amygdalae (the I-
ness), with the sense of story in the hippocampi, has gone askew. Too
much or too little ipseity both seem to be problematic, as if there is
some kind of sweet spot in between, where safety of observation can be
combined with the terror of absorption – where there is enough ipseity
to empathise, but not so much that personal concerns override those
of the fictional protagonist.
A sensitive balance between observer and participant is required
to promote engagement with story. Too much observer and there is no
longer any ‘fictional reality.’ Too much participant and the story
becomes scarily real – the vortex of story has swallowed the reader in
the telling of the tale. The well-balanced work of fiction (not to
mention, the well balanced life story) requires a type of neural balance
that has not received much in the way of scholarly attention in healthy
individuals.
In an evolutionary sense, this balance has been thousands of years
in the making, which takes us back to our central premise that stories
have the power to save us. Stories serve an important function in our
lives, and stories are generated by our brains. Our brains turn the
random nature of events and string these into meaningful narrative.
Stories are all about what directly impinges on our humanity. We see
the world in terms of story, and this creates the world we see. In other
words, the world becomes full of stories – sometimes they are our own
and sometimes they belong to others, but we recognise these stories
and follow them with deep fascination, which must have been the
evolutionary foundation of empathy. As Aristotle points out, in a great
tragedy like Oedipus Rex, the audience can identify that there is a
disaster looming, and regardless is hooked on seeing it unfold. Yet if
this tragedy were to happen in real life, probably few would want to
watch it.
Throughout evolution, stories have had the power to save us,
because instinct is tied to narrative. If evolution is all about the
survival of the fittest, then we have to be fit enough to tell stories.
Thanks to storytelling, evolution can take place in a single lifetime.
You don’t need to die of thirst to realise that going into the desert
without water is a bad idea. Stories precede us and guide us, even to
outfox hermetic knowledge, which would often evade the evolutionary
principle. In the words of Ian McEwan, through fiction, ‘what was
once a personal secret is now ours.’ [21]. There could be very few
people in Australia, for example, who haven’t heard stories about
travelers dying in the outback when their vehicles break down and
their water evaporates. Clearly, humanity has a need for story, as there
isn’t a culture anywhere in the world that survives without them.
Another distinguishing feature of human brains is that we have
very well developed frontal cortexes. These are used to inhibit the
storytelling mechanisms in both right and left hemispheres – to choose
the stories that we immerse ourselves in [6]. Humans can move
beyond the stories that are linked to our physical survival to evolve
into deeper thinkers. Storytelling in humans allows for the survival of
ideas and ideologies – often those that are metaphysical, abstract and
complex. This ability to choose the stories that are relevant to
humanity has given us the unique capability of abstraction,
imagination and even vision.
Less developed animals have smaller or even non-existent frontal
lobes. This means they have considerably less ability to abstract
themselves from the narrative of nature, or the simple narratives of
reality. The bird referred to earlier, eating seed, doesn’t have a choice
other than to use their right hemisphere to look out for danger and
mates, and use the left to look out for seed. Humans have the ability to
put all of those detailed concerns on hold and devote themselves to
more abstract activities, for large lengths of time even – perhaps even
long enough to read War and Peace [22]. Humans even have the
capacity to put aside their hunger in order to pander to abstraction. An
animal’s sense of ipseity, on the other hand, is constantly channeled
towards the most basic needs – there is little capacity for such
abstraction.
Storytelling, then, is essential to the way we construct our humanity.
It’s also vital to our study of the future (as there is no sense of future
without a sense of a past – and perhaps this explains our fascination as
a species for the study of history). Storytelling is central to humanity
because it is through narrative that we learn about ourselves and
prepare ourselves for the future in an evolutionary sense. But here’s
what’s interesting: we don’t only learn from ‘truth’ that is verifiable.
We learn equally, and potentially even more, from fiction. In words
attributed to Ralph Waldo Emerson, ‘fiction reveals truth that reality
obscures.’ The truth that literature provides does not need to prove
itself in any empirical way, except in the sense that this truth resonates
with the reader’s sense of truth. And this, in turn, becomes a point of
reference: a story nugget that is stored in the temporal lobes, to emerge
as insight and revelation in the context of real life. These nuggets, in
turn, become parts of new stories, and together the metanarrative of
human culture spins a half-real, half-fictional reality. In the words of
David Wilson, the narratives ‘that prove most innately satisfying
spread and become culture.’ When we search only for verifiable ‘truth’
we miss a historically rich and complete source of data that forms the
basis of our humanity [23]. Truth is to be found in empathy, and it is
the empathy in storytelling that Benjamin Rahabi is referring to when
he states that ‘stories have the power to save us.’
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